If It Were Your Family: Eleven Lives Lost in Longview, and Questions That Still Need Answers
Updated October 29, 2026
On May 26, 2026, a chemical storage tank failed at the Nippon Dynawave Packaging mill in Longview, Washington. Eleven workers died, and others suffered serious injuries. Washington’s Department of Labor & Industries confirmed the death toll and opened a workplace safety investigation. [Washington L&I’s incident record](https://lni.wa.gov/agency/messages/response-nippon-dynawave-tank-rupture/)
They had gone to work. Their families should have been able to expect them home.
Months later, this disaster deserves more than a repeated casualty count. Investigators have disclosed warnings about the tank’s condition before it failed. Environmental regulators have documented pollution and identified potential violations. Families have brought lawsuits.
These developments belong in the public record. So do the limits of what has been established.
The U.S. Chemical Safety Board’s August investigation update describes a catastrophic tank failure that released approximately 900,000 gallons of white liquor, a corrosive mixture used in pulp production. It reports three seriously injured employees and additional injuries to five employees and one firefighter.
The same update says a July 2025 inspection found parts of the tank wall below the calculated minimum safe thickness. The contractor recommended internal inspection and repairs, describing the tank as “not fit for continued service” unless repaired. Further inspections in October 2025 and February 2026 again found insufficient wall thickness. According to the CSB, the company did not internally inspect or repair the tank shell, remove it from service, or reduce its operating conditions before the failure. These are published investigative findings, but the document remains an investigation update rather than a final determination of all causes and responsibilities. [CSB investigation update](https://www.csb.gov/file.aspx?DocumentId=6345)
The question is now more specific than whether warning signs existed.
Who received those findings? Who decided the tank could remain in operation? What reasons supported that decision? What authority did workers have to challenge it? Which safeguards were supposed to prevent a known equipment concern from becoming a fatal event?
Those questions require documents, testimony, and a clear account of decisions. General statements about a commitment to safety cannot answer them.
Nippon Dynawave has said it is cooperating with investigators and has urged that the full investigative process be completed before conclusions are reached. It has declined to comment on individual findings while the investigation continues. That response should be recorded alongside the investigators’ findings. [Company incident updates](https://www.nippondynawave.com/incident-updates/)
The environmental consequences also require an accurate account.
On August 26, Washington’s Department of Ecology issued a notice identifying 35 initial environmental violations. The agency reported that released material reached storm drains and wastewater infrastructure, with some bypassing treatment and entering the Columbia River. Pollution also reached a nearby ditch, causing widespread fish deaths. Other findings concerned deficiencies in required plans and training.
The notice was an initial regulatory determination, not a final fine or court judgment. Ecology explained that the company could respond before further enforcement and that some emergency response actions might qualify for exemptions. [Ecology’s August 26 findings](https://www.ecology.wa.gov/about-us/who-we-are/news/2026/aug-26-ecology-issues-initial-determinations-of-environmental-violations-following-nippon-dynawave)
That documented pollution must not be confused with contamination of Longview’s municipal drinking water.
Ecology’s response updates reported that the city’s drinking water remained safe. They also documented elevated pH in affected drainage areas, fish deaths, cleanup work, and subsequent improvement in water conditions. This review found no reliable evidence establishing that the disaster contaminated the municipal drinking-water supply. Earlier statements suggesting the spill had not reached the Columbia must also be read alongside the later finding that some material did enter the river. [Ecology’s incident timeline](https://www.ecology.wa.gov/spills-cleanup/spills/spill-preparedness-response/responding-to-spill-incidents/spill-incidents/nippon-dynawave-industrial-incident)
Both facts matter: environmental damage occurred, and that does not establish that residents’ tap water was poisoned.
Residents deserve clear explanations of what was sampled, where, when, and with what results. If later findings change an earlier assessment, the correction should be visible. Public confidence depends on evidence people can examine.
There have also been developments in court.
On October 26, MyNorthwest reported lawsuits involving the families of Dillon Miller and Clinton “CJ” Doran, alleging that warnings about the tank were ignored. Its report also described a September wrongful-death lawsuit brought by Jared Ammons’s widow. The company said it could not comment on active litigation. These allegations have not been established merely because lawsuits were filed. [October 26 lawsuit coverage](https://mynorthwest.com/local/longview-paper-mill-lawsuit/4290578)
Ecology has also confirmed that the Washington Attorney General’s Office received authority to investigate potential criminal activity connected with the failure. An investigation does not itself establish that a crime occurred or that anyone has been charged. [Ecology’s account of the investigations](https://www.ecology.wa.gov/about-us/who-we-are/news/2026/aug-26-ecology-issues-initial-determinations-of-environmental-violations-following-nippon-dynawave)
As of this update, the public materials reviewed did not establish a final CSB causal report, a completed L&I enforcement outcome for the fatal tank failure, or a final judgment in the cited family lawsuits. This is a statement about the records located, not proof that no further work has occurred.
The remaining work matters to people whose lives were changed permanently.
For injured workers, recovery may extend far beyond discharge from hospital. For bereaved families, compensation proceedings and investigations unfold alongside grief. Their private medical and financial circumstances should not have to become public entertainment for their needs to receive attention.
The wider safety questions remain practical. How are inspection findings translated into decisions to repair or shut down equipment? Who can stop production when a serious hazard is identified? How are nearby workers protected if a large tank fails? Can emergency responders identify the released substance immediately? How will regulators verify that corrective measures actually work?
The answers should lead to changes that can be checked.
An earlier version of this article used an interim death-and-missing count and language that could imply drinking-water contamination or established long-term harm. This version corrects those points. It also replaces general accusations about ignored warnings with the specific findings now published by investigators.
A record becomes stronger when it is corrected.
MemSave preserves this account because public attention is temporary, while the consequences of a workplace disaster are not. Future updates should record final findings, enforcement decisions, court outcomes, environmental assessments, and verified safety improvements.
If it were your family, you would want more than condolences. You would want to know what happened, what was known beforehand, who made the decisions, and what will protect the next shift of workers.
Eleven people died in Longview. Remembering them means continuing to ask those questions—and keeping an accurate record of the answers.